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EQUITY JURISDICTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Three lectures, delivered by the writer of this article, in No-
vember, 1925, before the Law School of the University of Penn-
sylvania,1 treat of the place of common law in, our federal juris-
prudence; here, the purpose is to examine the equity side of the
same field, to show that, in the national courts, there is a chancery
jurisdiction which stands quite free of other juridical powers,
and that this is accompanied by a body of uniform rules and rem-
edies, not only separate and distinct from those of the various
states but entirely independent of, and uncontrolled by, the equity
systems there prevailing. In order, however, to understand the
genesis, nature and development of federal equity jurisdiction, it is
necessary to consider the subject in its relation to the correspond-
ing, though dissimilar, growth of equity jurisdiction in the states.
From this standpoint, the development of equity powers in the
federal courts is highly important,--even more important, per-
haps, than the development which has taken place on the common
law side of those tribunals; for, as Professor Beale has expressed
it, "In a system which has, separately, law and equity, the doc-
trines of equity represent the real law." 2
In some of the leading colonies, equity, as a remedial system,
either had no existence at all or, where it did exist, suffered from
"Published in 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 109, 270, 367 (1926).
2J. H. Beale, Equity in America, z CAMBRMGE L. 3. 21, 25 (I921).
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very imperfect and irregular administration. Then, again in early
times, and even after the adoption of the federal constitution,
equity jurisdiction encountered considerable hostility from the
people; as a consequence, it developed more slowly than the juris-
diction appertaining to courts of common law.3
Various reasons have been assigned for the existence of this
early American antipathy to equity jurisdiction. It may, to some
extent, have been a later reflection of the spirit of antagonism to
the Chancellor's power, which existed in England prior to the
Commonwealth, and which we find expressed by Selden, 4 and
other writers of his period; Selden characterized equity as a
"roguish thing." This explanation is appreciable when we re-
call that the administration of equity was not then based on set-
tled principles, but depended upon the exceedingly flexible con-
science of the Chancellor, whose ruling were contained in reports
which Judge Story subsequently described as "shadowy, obscure
and flickering." 5 As Professor Maitland points out,8 under the
Commonwealth,
"vigorous attempts were made to reform [equity] procedure;
some were for abolishing it altogether, since it was not easily
forgotten that the Court of Chancery was the twin sister of
the Court of Star Chamber."
Probably this feeling of hostility in England colored the
minds of the colonists, but there were other and stronger causes
which tended to foster the continuing antagonism to chancery
jurisdiction.
The supplicatory form of a bill in equity was opposed to the
religious principles of the Puritan, 7 and, among the people gen-
erally, no doubt the popular distrust of the legal profession 8 had
some adverse effect; these factors may have operated to a certain
'I STORY, EQUITY (14th ed., I918), par. 56.
" SELDEN, TABLE TALK, chapter on Equity.
'Vidal v. Girard's Exrs., 2 How. 127, 193 (U. S. 1844).
'MAITLAND, EQUIY (i909) 10.
THarrington Putnam, Early Administration of Equity in this Country,
go CENT. L. J. 423, 426 (192o).
8 WARRE, HISTORY OF THE AmRCAN BAR-LAw WITHOUT LAWYERS
(191) 3-18.
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extent in making difficult the progress of equity, but they cannot
be considered the determining causes. The fundamental explana-
tion is probably to be found in the fact that the colonists regarded
equity as an appanage of the Crown's prerogative, and, therefore,
inimical to their individual liberties. 9 Chancellors were accord-
ingly regarded as "royalist persons administering the law of an
effete monarchy,"-law "which had never taken foothold in the
democratic part of America"; 10 this was particularly true of New
England.
In Pennsylvania, various efforts were made to erect a sepa-
rate court of chancery, one of which succeeded, and for a brief
period, 1720 to 1736, such a tribunal functioned, but its influence
was limited; later, Pennsylvania, in the absence of the court of
chancery, which had been abolished, administered equitable rights
and remedies through common-law forms. Separate courts of
chancery had been erected in other parts of the country, particu-
larly in New Jersey and in the South, but, generally, no uniform
or substantial equity jurisprudence could be said to have devel-
oped throughout the colonies.
At the time of the ratification of the Constitution, Hamilton,
writing in the Federalist " on the proper scope of trial by jury,
remarked the material diversity which prevailed in the several
states, owing to differences in the nature and structure of their
various courts, both as to the extent of trial by jury and the
modification of that institution as used in civil cases; and in this
connection he took occasion to indicate where and how courts of
equity were functioning at that time.
"In New Jersey," he wrote, "there is a court of chan-
cery which proceeds like ours [New York]. . . . In
Pennsylvania . . . there is no court of chancery and its
common law courts have equity jurisdiction. Delaware has
in these respects imitated Pennsylvania. Maryland ap-
proaches more nearly to New York, as does also Virginia,
except that the latter has a plurality of chancellors. North
'See 3 BL. Comm. *49, for brief history of equity courts, connecting them
with the king and his privy council.
',J. H. Beale, op. cit. supra note 2 at 23.
=No. 83.
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Carolina bears most affinity to Pennsylvania; South Caro-
lina to Virginia. . . In Georgia there are none but
common-law courts. . . In Connecticut they have no
distinct courts . . . of chancery [but] their common-law
courts have . . . to a certain extent, equity jurisdiction.
In cases of importance their general assembly is the only
court of chancery. Rhode Island is, I believe, . . . pretty
much in the situation of Connecticut. Massachusetts and
New Hampshire, in regard to the blending of law and equity,
are in a similar predicament."
The diversity in equity jurisdiction pointed out by Hamil-
ton, must have been considered an important fact by the first
Congress when it undertook to make effective the jurisdiction con-
ferred on the national courts by the judiciary article of the federal
Constitution. This provides that the judicial power of the federal
government shall "extend to all cases at law or in equity arising
under the Constitution and laws of the United States," etc.; and
in giving effect to this grant of power, it was important to deter-
mine by what principles of law and equity the federal courts
should be bound in carrying out their authorized jurisdiction. On
the common law side there was less difficulty than in the field of
equity, because the common law of each state was more substan-
tially developed and more accessible as a system, since, in sub-
stance, it was usually the unwritten law of the mother country
moulded to suit the new condition of colonial life; but, as already
pointed out, this was not so on the equity side, for such a condi-
tion of affairs was prevented by the early hostility to that juris-
diction, which still persisted' when the first Congress met to draft
the Judiciary Act, in 1789. At that time there was a strong anti-
chancery party, whose persistent objectors made its influence felt
during the course of debate on the various sections of the act,
particularly on those dealing with equity; and it succeeded in af-
fecting many ultimate provisions of the statute. This was par-
ticularly true, as Mr. Warren has shown, 12 in regard to Section I6.
When introduced, Section I6 provided that "suits in-equity shall
not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States where
"Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act,
37 HARv. L. REV. 49, 96 (1924).
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a remedy may be had at law"; as soon as discussion began on this
part of the act, "the batteries of those who opposed all equity juris-
diction were at once opened," 13 and the subsequent consideration
of the Section "gave rise to one of the hottest contests" of the
session.
14
It was decided to retain the section, "and the phraseology,"
says Mr. Warren, "was apparently strengthened in favor of
equity jurisdiction by adding the word 'complete' before the
word 'remedy.'" Later, it was moved to insert the words "plain,
adequate and" before the word "complete"; 15 and this was
adopted, making the section read "suits in equity shall not be sus-
tained . . . where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may
be had at law." This, as we may see, required not only the ex-
istence of a remedy at law, but a "plain, adequate and complete"
one, to oust equity jurisdiction in the federal courts.
Some indication of the state of feeling during the debate
may be obtained from Maclay, who was bitterly opposed to the
section. He states:
"The lawyers were in a rage for speaking; many things
were said in favor of chancery that I knew to be wrong . . . ;
the gentlemen of the bar in the house seemed to have made
common cause of it to push the power of chancery as far as
possible." 18
But, apparently, those on the other side were not dormant,
for a further example of an attempt by the anti-chancery party
to revolutionize equity jurisdiction is noted by Mr. Warren. The
Senate, it appears,
"had amended . . . the original draft which required that
trials of facts in the district and circuit courts (except in
admiralty and maritime causes) should be by jury, by insert-
ing a further provision that there should be a similar jury
trial of facts 'on any hearing of a cause in equity in a circuit




"MACLAY, SKETCHES OF DEBATE IN FIRST SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
(Harris ed.) July I; quoted in Warren, ibid.
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equity procedure, the Senate now voted to expunge, not be-
ing willing to yield any further to the anti-equity faction.
An attempt later by Maclay and Ellsworth, supported by R.
H. Lee, to reverse this vote, failed." 17
Maclay, in speaking of Ellsworth's position, said that he
did not know whether it was the "effect of judgment, whim or
caprice," but that he was, "generally, for limiting the chancery
powers." 1I Maclay himself, it seems, "fought against equity
chiefly on the ground that it deprived parties of jury trials and
resulted in costs, delays and innumerable reviews. He believed
the general opinion over the Union, excepting amongst lawyers,
was opposed to chancery courts." 19
Despite the numerous endeavors of the anti-chancery party
to restrict the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts, the statute
as finally adopted afforded considerable opportunity for develop-
ment in that field. It was ordained by the Process Act of 1789 20
that
"the forms of proceedings in causes of equity . . . shall
be according to the course of the civil law."
This Act, by its own terms, was to be in force only until the
close of the next session of Congress. It was therefore replaced
by the Act of 1792, which provides that
"the forms and modes of proceeding in suits . . . of
equity [shall be] according to the principles, rules, and usages
which belong to courts of equity . . . as contradis-
tinguished from courts of common law; except so far as
may have been provided for by the act to establish the judi-
cial courts of the United States, subject, however, to such al-
terations and additions as the said courts respectively shall
in their discretion deem expedient, or to such regulations as
the Supreme Court of the United States shall think proper
from time to time by rule to prescribe." 21
1 Warren, ibid., 99.
MACLAY, July 9, quoted in Warren, ibid., 99n.
"Warren, ibid., 99.
0I STAT. 93.
n x STAT. 276.
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This clause reached its final form in the Revised Statutes,
where it is worded as follows:
"The forms and modes of proceeding in suits of equity
. . . shall be according to the principles, rules and usages
which belong to courts of equity . . ., except when it is
otherwise provided by statute or by rules of court made in
pursuance thereof." 22
By Section i i of the Judiciary Act of 1789,23 it was ordained
that
"Circuit courts shall have original cognizance [Revised
statute uses 'jurisdiction' instead of 'cognizance'] of all suits
of a civil nature at common law or in equity where the mat-
ter in dispute exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, and
an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the state
where it is brought and a citizen of another state";
and by Section 16, that
"Suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the
courts of the United States in any case where a plain, ade-
quate and complete remedy may be had at law," 24
which means, of course, that jurisdiction in equity can be invoked
in all appropriate cases where no such common law remedy is
available.
In the same act, by Chapter zo, Section 34,25 "inserted at
the very end of the statute, between two sections dealing exclu-
sively with criminal matters," 26 Congress directed that
"the laws of the several states, except where the Constitu-
tion, treaties or statutes . . . otherwise require or pro-
vide, [should] be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States in cases
where they apply."
'REv. STAT. § 913.
2I STAT. 78, REv. STAT. § 629.
24 1 STAT. 82, REv. STAT. § 723.
i STAT. 92, REV. STAT. § 721.2'Warren, op. cit. supra note z2 at 8I..
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Probably no section of the Judiciary Act proved of greater
importance in the subsequent history of the federal judicial sys-
tem than the one just quoted. Though many believe it was in-
tended that the national courts should follow the common as well
as the statutory law of the state in which the trial tribunal hap-
pened to be sitting, yet nothing is said in the above-quoted section
as to following state laws in equity suits; and it is largely due to
this omission that, on the chancery side, the federal courts have
been able to develop consistently a body of uniform rules and
principles, uncontrolled by and independent of the legislation of
the various states of the Union.
By the Act of 1792, commonly known as the "Process Act,"
Congress confirmed the modes of common law proceeding then
used in the federal courts and further declared that, so far as the
courts of the United States are concerned, the modes of proceed-
ing in equity should be "according to the principles, rules and
usages which belong to courts of equity . . . as contradis-
tinguished from courts of common law," except where such pro-
ceeding is especially provided for by rules of court or federal
statute.
2 T
"It is material to consider," said Mr. Justice Todd in
an early case,2 8 "whether it was the intention of Congress,
by these provisions, to confine the courts of the United
States, in their mode of administering relief, to the same
remedies, and those only, with all their incidents, which ex-
isted in the courts of the respective states. In other words,
whether it was their intention to give the party relief at law
where the practice of the state courts would give it, and re-
lief in equity only when, according to such practice, a plain,
adequate and complete remedy could not be had at law."
After stating this question, the learned justice went on to
say:
"In some states of the Union, no court of chancery ex-
ists to administer equitable relief. In some of those states,
courts of law recognize and enforce in suits at law, all the
2I STAT. 275, REV. STAT. 9 913.
2Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212, 222 (U. S. 1818).
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equitable claims and rights which a court of equity would
recognize and enforce; in others, all relief is denied, and
such equitable claims and rights are to be considered as mere
nullities at law. A construction, therefore, that would adopt
the state practice, in all its extent, would at once extinguish,
in such states, the exercise of equitable jurisdiction."
Early in the history of federal jurisprudence (I818), it was
held 29 that to effectuate the purposes of Congress, equity suits
were to be instituted and conducted in the courts of the United
States, not according to the practice of state courts in this par-
ticular, but according to the practice prevailing in the courts of
England, whence we derived our knowledge of equity principles;
and, later, Mr. Justice Story said: 30
"The chancery jurisdiction given by the Constitution
and laws of the United States is the same in all the states of
the Union and the rule of decision is the same in all," adding
that, "In the exercise of that jurisdiction, the courts of the
United States are not governed by the state practice; . .
the remedies in equity are to be administered, not according
to the state practice, but according to the practice of the
courts of equity in the parent country [at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution] . . ., subject, of course,'to
the provisions of acts of Congress and to such alterations
and rules as in the exercise of the powers delegated by these
acts, the courts of the United States may, from time to time,
prescribe."
Still later, the federal Supreme Court, speaking by Mr. Jus-
tice Davis,31 repeated the earlier doctrine that
"the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over con-
troversies between citizens of different states cannot be im-
paired by the laws of the states, which prescribe the modes
of redress in their courts, or which regulate the distribution
of their judicial power."
"Ibid.
"Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 647, 658 (U. S. i832).
"Payne v. Hook, 74 U. S. 425, 430 (x868).
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He said, further:
"If legal remedies [in the federal courts] are sometimes
modified to suit the changes in the laws of the states, and the
practice of their courts, it is not so with the equitable; the
equity jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts is the
same that the High Court of Chancery in England possesses,
is subject to neither limitation nor restraint by state legis-
lation, and is uniform throughout the different states of the
Union."
Numerous authorities in unbroken sequence have firmly
established the doctrine which the earlier federal cases laid
down; so that, not only are both the principles and practice of the
High Court of Chancery recognized in the administration of
equity in the national courts, but, so far as these tribunals are
concerned, the administration is uniform throughout the Union,
and it is settled law that courts of the United States do not lose
any of their chancery jurisdiction in states where no equity courts
exist or in states where the rights and remedies may be different
from those administered by the English Court of Chancery. The
effect, therefore, of the interpretation which the federal courts
have given to the grant of equitable jurisdiction contained in the
federal Constitution, and statutes passed in conformity with it,
has been to create a distinct body of rules and practice in equity
administration, uncontrolled by state legislation, so that, says
Pomeroy,
"it is the same in Louisiana with its civil law code; 32 in
California, with its code combining legal and equitable doc-
trines; and in New Jersey, which has preserved the ancient
English system of common-law equity almost unaffected by
modern legal reform. Whatever may be the municipal law of
any particular state, either in its substance or its form, the
United States courts in that state preserve their equitable
jurisdiction, and administer their equitable jurisprudence
unchanged by such local legislation, [and] it follows as a
necessary consequence from this principle, that the formed
system of procedure now prevailing in many states and terri-
tories, whereby all distinction between suits in equity and at
'Bein v. Heath, I2 How. i68 (U. S. i85i).
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law is abolished, . . . has not in the least affected either
the doctrines of equity jurisprudence administered, nor the
extent and modes of equity jurisdiction exercised, by the
national courts situated and acting within the same common-
wealth." 83
Thus state laws subtracting from or limiting the scope of
equity do not affect the chancery jurisdiction held by the national
courts. This principle is vital to the proper administration of
federal equity jurisprudence; for, otherwise, owing to the vary-
ing development equity has undergone in the several states of the
Union, not only would the remedies and procedure in one United
States court be different from, and perhaps in conflict with those
in another such court, but the express direction of Section i6 of
the Judiciary Act, that "suits in equity shall not be sustained
in any case where a plain, adequate and complete rem-
edy may be had at law," as well as the right to trial by jury guar-
anteed in the seventh amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion, might be impaired in federal courts sitting in those states
which have abolished the distinction between legal and equitable
actions or in other ways have varied their equity practice.
While state legislation "cannot influence federal jurisdiction
negatively so as to narrow it, [yet in certain situations] it may
operate affirmatively so as, at least indirectly, to enlarge it." 34
In order to understand this rule and the types of situations state
legislation may affect, it is important to note the distinctions which
exist between various popular uses of the word "jurisdiction."
Treating of this point, the Illinois Supreme Court said in a recent
case:
"While jurisdiction in its proper sense means authority
to hear and decide a cause, it is common to speak of juris-
diction in equity . . . as not relating to the power of a
court to hear and determine a cause but as to whether it
ought to assume the jurisdiction and hear and decide the
cause, [so that] we often find . . jurisdiction denied
where [what really is meant is that] the power exists but
ought not to be exercised, and in this sense, [when applied
"I PommOy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 292.
"Ibid. § 293.
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by a court of equity] jurisdiction . means a want of
equity and not a want of power;" 85
whereas when it is said in judicial opinions that
"a state law cannot give jurisdiction to a federal court but
may give a substantial right which will be enforced in a fed-
eral court, jurisdiction in the strict sense is [usually]
meant." 36
The rule as to state legislation affecting federal equity juris-
diction may be put tersely thus: The power of the national courts
to hear and decide equity causes cannot be impaired by state legis-
lation, but the primary rights and privileges of litigant parties
may be governed by or created by the laws of a state, and if the
elements of federal jurisdiction are present, such enlarged or new
rights or privileges will be protected, maintained and enforced
by the United States courts in appropriate equity proceedings.
3 7
It is no barrier to federal equity jurisdiction that rights or
privileges of state creation may exist in no other state of the
Union; if the rights or privileges in question fall within the scope
of the general . . . chancery powers which the federal govern-
ment has bestowed upon its courts, they will be enforced for the
jurisdiction to that end comes only from national law.88 The fed-
eral courts, when enforcing substantive rights of state creation,
are of course bound by the Constitution of the United States and
all relevant federal statutes, hence the state law
"cannot control proceedings in the federal courts so as to do
do away with the force of [Section 16 of the Act of 1789,]
declaring that 'suits in equity shall not be sustained in either
of the courts of the United States in any case where a plain,
adequate and complete remedy may be had at law,' or the
constitutional right of parties in actions at law to a trial by
jury." 39
'Miller v. Rowan, 251 Ill. 344, 348, 96 N. E. 285, 287 (i9"I).
3633 YALE L. J. 193 Note (924), citing Ex Parte McNeil, 13 Wall. 236
(U. S. i87).
"Lorman v. Clarke, 2 McLean 568 (C. C. 1841).
"C. A. HUSTON, TnE ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY, I HARvARD
STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE 28 (I915).
"Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146, 152 (i8go).
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Where there is, under the laws of certain states, a blending
of legal and equitable actions, this will not be permitted in the
federal courts if such a course might result in depriving a party
of his constitutional right to a jury trial. As Mr. Justice Bald-
win said in Baker v. Biddle: 
40
"Whenever a court of law is competent to take cog-
nizance of a right, and has power to proceed to a final judg-
ment, which affords a remedy, plain, adequate and complete,
without the aid of a court of equity, the plaintiff must pro-
ceed at law, because the defendant has a constitutional right
of trial by jury. If the right is only an equitable one, or, if
legal, the remedy is only equitable, or both legal and eq-
uitable, partaking of the character of both, and a court of
law is unable to afford a remedy according to its old and set-
tled proceedings commensurate with the right, the suit for
its assertion may be in equity."
Similarly, in Boyce's Executors v. Grundy,41 Mr. Justice
Johnson said:
"This court has often been called upon to consider Sec-
tion I6 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and as often, either
expressly or by the course of its decisions, has held that it
is merely declaratory, making no alteration whatever in the
rules of equity on the subject of legal remedy. It-is not
enough that there is a remedy at law; it must be plain and
adequate, or, in other words, as practical and efficient to the
ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy
in equity."
In Scott v. Neely,42 Mr. Justice Field observed that
"All actions which seek to recover specific property,
real or personal, with or without damages for its detention,
or a money judgment for breach of a simple contract, or as
damages for injury to person or property, are legal actions,
and can be brought in the federal courts only on their law
side. Demands of this kind do not lose their character as
claims cognizable in the courts of the United States only on
'i Bald. 394, 405 (C. C. 1831).
"13 Pet. 210, 2,5 (U. S. i83o).
I40 U. S. io6, IIo (i8go).
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their law side, because in some state courts, by virtue of
state legislation, equitable relief in aid of the demand at law
may be brought in the same action. Such blending of rem-
edies is not permissible in the courts of the United States."
The authorities thus far reviewed show that, while the sev-
eral state legislatures may not affect equitable procedure or rem-
edies administered in federal courts, yet they may, within the
limitations already discussed, create new substantive rights and
privileges enforceable on the chancery side of those tribunals;
therefore it becomes an important question to determine whether
a particular state enactment deals with substantive rights or
privileges or with only remedial adjective rights. The former
will be recognized by the federal courts, while the latter will
not; 43 and in order to ascertain in any particular case what effect
will be given by the federal courts to these respective classes of
rights or privileges, this distinction must be kept in mind. Con-
sequently, state statutes
"which allow a court in equity to accomplish a result which
could be attained by an action at law give a remedial ad-
jective [privilege], and its enforcement would deprive the
litigant of his constitutional right to trial by jury." 44
This result is not permitted in the United States courts, and
federal equity jurisdiction, though very broad, is limited accord-
ingly; it is limited also by the rule that it is to be given effect only
when no plain, complete and adequate remedy exists at law.
The United States courts, then, by interpreting the language
of the original statutes creating their equity jurisdiction as con-
ferring those powers which were exercised by the High Court of
Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, have been enabled to administer, within the above-
noted restrictions, a system of equity which is not only uniform
throughout the Union but is independent of and uncontrolled by
the local legislation of the various states in which the courts may
See 33 YALE L. J. 193 (1924) for an analysis of the distinction.
SIbid., 195-
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be sitting. Fortunately for the ultimate growth of national
equity jurisdiction, the early colonial and state hostility to chan-
cery powers did not operate materially to restrict the federal
judiciary in that field; on the contrary, it is more likely that the
fact of the absence of any uniform or substantial chancery juris-
diction prevailing in the states at the time of the ratification of the
Constitution really proved a boon which made possible the de-
velopment in the federal courts of an equity system wholly na-
tional in character.
The strength and flexibility of the system is assured, and
with the increasing complexity of modern transactions, it no
doubt will expand to meet the demands of changing conditions
which require equitable treatment. This expansive power was
well indicated by Mr. Justice Brewer, of the United States Su-
preme Court, when he said:
"It is a mistake to suppose that for the determination of
equities and equitable rights we must look only to the
statutes of Congress; the principles of equity exist inde-
pendently of and anterior to all congressional legislation,
and the statutes are either annunciations of those principles
or limitations upon their application in particular cases . . .;
we must bear in mind the general principles of equity and
determine rights upon those principles except as they are
limited by special statutory provisions." 45
Whatever place in our federal jurisprudence the writers on
the subject may assign to the common law, there undoubtedly has
developed an equity system which may truly be called national.
Robert von Moschzisker.
'U. S. v. Detroit Lumber Co., 20o U. S. 321, 339 (19o). See also Lor-
man v. Clarke, supra note 37, which contains a good discussion.
